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Pay for Performance in Primary Care in England and California: Comparison of Unintended Consequences

National Primary Care Research and Development Centre, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom

CORRESPONDING AUTHOR: Ruth McDonald, PhD, National Primary Care Research and Development Centre, The University of Manchester, Williamson Bldg, Oxford Rd, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK, ruth.mcdonald{at}manchester.ac.uk

PURPOSE We undertook an in-depth exploration of the unintended consequences of pay-for-performance programs In England and California.

METHODS We interviewed primary care physicians in California (20) and England (20) and compared unintended consequences in each setting. Interview recordings were transcribed verbatim and subjected to thematic analysis.

RESULTS Unintended consequences reported by physicians varied according to the incentive program. English physicians were much more likely to report that the program changed the nature of the office visit. This change was linked to a larger number of performance measures and heavy reliance on electronic medical records, with computer prompts to facilitate the delivery of performance measures. Californian physicians were more likely to express resentment about pay for performance and appeared less motivated to act on financial incentives, even in the program with the highest rewards. The inability of Californian physicians to exclude individual patients from performance calculations caused frustration, and some physicians reported such undesirable behaviors as forced disenrollment of noncompliant patients. English physicians are assessed using data extracted from their own medical records, whereas in California assessment mostly relies on data collected by multiple third parties that may have different quality targets. Assessing performance based on these data contributes to feelings of resentment, lack of understanding, and lack of ownership reported by Californian physicians.

CONCLUSIONS Our study findings suggest that unintended consequences of incentive programs relate to the way in which these programs are designed and implemented. Although unintended, these consequences are not necessarily unpredictable. When designing incentive schemes, more attention needs to be paid to factors likely to produce unintended consequences.

Key Words: Reimbursement, incentive • primary health care • United Kingdom • California

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